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In the Shadow of the Pentagon 
The tiny Republic of Palau, in the far western Pacific, 
has taken a dramatic step to confront United States 
attempts to miltarize the islands. Their unique Consti-
tution , approved over U.S. objections, bans nuclear 
weapons and nuclear waste without the approval of 
75% of the votes cast in a referendum. The Palauans 
have effectively created a nuclear free zone around 
their islands. 
But the Constitution is just the latest in a long history 
of Palauan actions to prevent outside control of their 
islands. When U.S. military plans for use of 30% of their 
islands were first announced in 1972, traditional and 
elected leaders immediately went on record<>pposing 
the plans. During the mid1970's, the 14,000 Palauans 
were successfully organizing local and international 
support to turn back a massive oil superport/industrial 
center planned for Palau, with the support of the U.S. 
military. And today, after four years of struggle, the 
people of Palau are still defending the integrity of their 
Constitution in the face of strong pressures from the 
U.S. government. 
Just 500 miles east of the Philippines and in close 
proximity to the Asian mainland, Palau is a stra-
tegically important island group to the Pentagon. To 
quell Palauan fears, the U.S. says it has not current 
military plans for Palau, it only wants "options" to use 
the land for jungle warfare training, weapons storage 
and transit and overflight of nuclear vessels and 
aircraft. 
Many Palauans, however, believe the U.S. military 
will bring another war to Palau. Remembering their 
experience in World War 11, when thousands died and 
the islands were devastated, older Palauans remark: 
"When soldiers come, war comes." 
Palau's Constitution is a logical step for a people 
whose life is tied to the ocean and land-and who are 
confronted with the U.S. military bent on gaining 
"options" to use a major portion of their limited land. In 
the shadow of the Pentagon and long isolated from the 
international media and support networks, the 
Palauans have consistently struggled to self-deter-
mine their future and regain the right to govern their 
islands. It is now imperative that people and organi-
zations internationally-and especially in the U.S.-
support Palau's attempt to maintain its unique, 
democratically approved, Constitution. 
Background 
In 1979, the Republic of Palau was the first nation in 
the world to adopt a Constitution that banned the 
storage, testing and disposal of nuclear materials 
within its territory without the approval of 75% of the 
votes cast in a referendum. The United States State 
Department has repeatedly stated that the Palau 
Constitution is "incompatible" with the Compact of 
Free Association, a treaty that has been developed 
during 14 years of negotiations. In response, the 
Palauans initially approved their Constitution by a 92% 
margin in July 1979. In two separate referenda-
. . SAN FRANCISCO\ 
· .... ~ONOLUW 
Tlftl nlltTllll'f 
necessitated by U.S. objections to the nuclear ban and 
other provisions-the Palauans reaffirmed the 
provisions of their nuclear-free Constitution by 70% 
and 78% majorities. 
The Compact of Free Association, signed by Palau 
and U.S. government representatives in August 1982, 
grants Palau more than $1 billion in aid and a form of 
self-government in exchange for absolute U.S. military 
authority over the islands. The Compact also provides 
the U.S. with an option to use approximately 30% of the 
island area for military bases, weapons storage 
facilities, jungle warfare training operations, and 
transit of nuclear vessels and aircraft. 
The U.S., which won Palau and the other 
Micronesian islands from Japan at the end of World 
War II, has administered the islands as a United 
Nations "Strategic" Trust Territory since 1947. The 
U.S. is seeking to end its role as administrator of Palau 
under the Trusteeship while retaining strategic 
military control over this emerging western Pacific 
nation. 
February 1983 Pleblsclte In Palau 
On February 10, 1983 voters in Palau were the first of 
the Micronesian districts to vote on the Compact. In a 
split proposition voters were asked whether they 
approved of Section 314 of the Compact. Section 314 
would allow the U.S. to store nuclear weapons in Palau 
and the presence of nuclear powered ships or 
materials. The vote on this proposition (53%) fell far 
short of the 75% approval required by the Palauan 
Constitution. The other part of the split proposition 
asked voters to review the Compact as a whole. 62% of 
the voters voted for the Compact. However, the ballot 
itself stated, "Before, the Compact can take effect 
Section 314 ... must also be approved by at least 75% 
of the votes cast." Since Section 314 lost by a 
substantial margin-the Compact cannot take effect. 
After 14 years of negotiations the political status of 
Palau remains unsettled. 
On February 25, the Senate of the Palau National 
Congress (OEK) passed Resolution #87. The 
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resolution stated that the citizens of Palau had 
disapproved the Compact. The same resolution stated 
that the Senate had also disapproved the Compact. 
The resolution went on to call upon the President of 
Palau and Palau's traditional leaders to renegotiate the 
political status of the islands. The Traditional Council 
of Chiefs and the High Chief lbedul have stated the 
Compact is dead. 
United States' Position 
Following the plebiscite, the State Department 
characterized the separate nuclear question on the 
ballot as merely an " internal referendum question." 
The State Department further argues: "The Palauan 
authorities must now devise an acceptable method of 
reconciling their constitutional provisions to comply 
with the mandate of the Palauan electorate for free 
association with the United States." International law 
expert Roger Clark commented in March 1983: "I 
believe this to be a serious distortion of the results of 
the vote," adding that "the United States, having 
acquiesced in, or perhaps even insisted upon. the way 
in which the issue was presented to the voters, is surely 
bound by the results." (See "Legal Implications of 
Palau Vote") Nevertheless, the State Department has 
set up transition offices in Palau (and other parts of 
Micronesia) to begin implementation of the Compact, 
in spite of its rejection by voters and prior to review and 
approval by the U.S. Congress. 
"The United States Is so concerned about Its mllltary 
options, It has steadfastly refused to accept the peo-
ple's wishes. We have said no four times to the United 
States' nuclear Intentions In four referenda In four 
years. When wlll we be heard? We have voted demo-
cratlcally and the United States must accept our vote. 
Does democracy apply only In the United States and 
not In Palau? 
"The Palauan people need time to decide on their 
own kind of government and economy without Inter-
ference. We call upon the Trusteeship Council of the 
United Nations to support our right to choose the 
future of Palau, rather than support the attempts of the 
United States to determine our future for us." 
-Bernie Keldermans, Educator and Koror 
Councilwoman, United Nations Trusteeship 
Council, May, 1983. 
U.S. Involvement In the Palau Pleblsclte Process 
U.S. officials stated on numerous occasions that 
they had no part in the plebiscite process, when in fact 
the U.S. was involved in all phases of the plebiscite: 
• According to a Palau Supreme Court ruling, ballot 
wording for the plebiscite drafted by the Palau 
National Congress "was rejected outright by the 
U.S." and U.S. State Department Ambassador Fred 
Zeder, in a November 11 , 1982 cable, instructed the 
Palau Government to change the wording. This U.S. 
directed wording was later declared misleading and 
illegal by the Palau Supreme Court just 10 days 
before the plebiscite. 
Palauans rally February 3 to demand the plebiscite on 
the Compact of Free Association be postponed. 
• Over $439,000 dollars was appropriated for a "voter 
education" program which degenerated into a pro-
Compact campaign. Of that sum $315,000 was 
directly allocated by Interior Assistant Secretary 
Pedro Sanjuan via the High Commissioner, Janet 
McCoy. This compares with the $400,000 recently 
spent by the electoral commission In El Salvador of 
which $240,000 was a direct allocation from the U.S. 
The people of El Salvador number 5 million, the 
people of Palau number 15,000. Palauan law 1-43 
limited all spending on the plebiscite to $250,000. 
• The so-called political "education" became a one-
sided promotion of the Compact, as demonstrated 
by a "People's Fact Sheet" in Palauan and English 
published by the Palau Government in January, 
1983. This document stated all the benefits of the 
Compact but none of the drawbacks. For example, it 
pointed out the many immigration rights Palauans 
would have for travel and employment in the U.S., 
without mentioning that Americans would have the 
same rights in Palau. 
• The Dept. of Interior and the United Statt:., 
Information Agency (USIA) hired a four member 
"plebiscite expert team" to monitor the plebisicite. 
Plebiscite Irregularities 
In the haste and under U.S. pressure to proceed 
quickly to conclude the pleb iscite numerous 
irregularities concerning voting procedures and ballot 
collection occurred. Confusion marred the plebiscite 
process: 
• The date of the plebiscite was changed four times. 
• The official Rules and Regulations for the plebiscite 
were changed four times, once three hours after the 
polls were open. 
• Five Palauan Senators have filed a civil complaint 
seeking the return of over $200,000 in mis-allocated 
or unauthorized expenditures of the public "voter 
education campaign." 
• There were numerous irregularities in the conduct 
of the absentee vote which amounted to nearly a 
fifth (1 ,300) of the total 7,200 votes cast. 
Continued on page 6 
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Self-Determination, U.S. Style 
When the Palau National Congress on 
November 9, 1982 approved the wording for 
the ballot (according to Public Law 1-43 
governing the plebiscite), the U.S Ambassador 
Fred Zeder cabled the Palau Government on 
November 11 instructing it to change the 
wording used. According to the January 31 
Palau Supreme Court decision, Palau 
"Ambassador Salii has testified that the 
wording in Republic of Palau Law No. 1-43 was 
rejected outright by the United States and It 
was Insisted that the wording Incorporated In 
the cable of November 11, 1982 be placed on 
the ballot." (Emphasis added.) 
More than six weeks later on December 20, 
in a successful effort to counter requests for a 
postponement and insure U.N. observation 
thus legitimizing the controversial plebiscite, 
the United States' representative to the U.N. 
Trusteeship Council told that body: 
The United States is not conducting the 
plebiscite; the Government of Palau is 
conducting it . Naturally , we had 
discussions with the Palauans about the 
language of the ballot, but that language, 
In the last analysis Is theirs; they are the 
ones who are deciding how to put the 
matter to their people ... The second 
question on that ballot was phrased 
according to their wishes, and since they 
are the constltutlonally elected 
Government we shall have to accept It as 
Is. (Emphasis added.) 
The ballot wording was not Palauan, it was 
dictated by the U.S. State Department. Had 
two Palauan elected leaders not successfully 
taken the issue to the Palau Supreme Court, 
the Palauan people would have been faced 
with a "completely misleading statement" on 
the ballot, said international law expert Roger 
Clark. That the United States should deceive 
the U.N. to get its approval for the plebiscite 
shows a strong contempt for democratic 
processes. 
POLITICAL EDUCATION 
Contrary to State Department assertions that the 
people of Palau, after 14 years of negotiations, are 
"fully familiar" with the Compact, numerous Palauans 
charge that there was inadequate time to understand 
the implications of this lengthy document. In January, 
the Palau Senate passed a bill to delay the vote in part 
because "the political education process has been 
slow, inadequate and misleading." 
-
~ 
Sign used in Palau Compact campaign depicts life under the military if the 
Compact is approved and urges a "no" vote. Note the man handing the military 
guard a pass. 
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If forward military bases are the achilles heel of 
United States foreign policy, then the Micronesian 
islands are destined to be a region of increasing strug-
gle in the 1980's and l 990's. With major U.S . military 
installations in Guam and the Marshall Islands, and 
bases planned for Tinian, other parts of the Mariana 
Islands and Palau, Micronesia may become one of the 
most densely militarized regions in the Pacific. These 
bases, strategically located along the Asian periphery, 
will provide the U.S. with staging grounds for future 
intervention into Asia. 
But stepped up campaigns by Micronesians and 
other Pacific Islanders in support of nuclear free 
zones and demilitarization are putting U.S. military 
plans in jeopardy. It is not suprising, therefore, that 
in 1982 former U.S. ambassador to Fiji, William 
Bodde, asserted that the U.S. must " do everything in 
its power· to counter the Nuclear Free Pacific move-
ment." 
Although during the 1950's and 1960's, U.S. 
policy makers considered the Pacific to be a region of 
relatively little importance, by the 1970's that had 
changed. In 1973, U.S. Secretary of State James 
Schlesinger said: "The region not only surrounds the 
access routes to Guan,, but also those to the Near 
East, and our sources of Asian raw materials can be 
controlled from Micronesia. Moreover, a north-south 
line of communication, of greater and greater impor-
tance, passes through the region, linking our Northern 
allies, Japan and Korea, to our allies in the South, 
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Indonesia . 
In the strong sense of the term, the U.S. must remain 
a Pacific power." 
Additionally, with the growing economic impor-
tance of the Pacific region, American officials no 
longer view Micronesia solely for its strategic value. 
The economic potential, as yet untapped, of the is-
lands which cover three million square miles of ocean 
area, are an underlying reason for U.S. attempts to 
gain permanent military control of Micronesia . 
Micronesia, consisting of the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Republic of Belau, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and Commonwealth of the Northern 
Marianas (Guam has been a U.S. Territory since 
1898), has been governed by the U.S. under a United 
Nations Trusteeship Agreement since it took the is-
lands from Japan at the end of World War II. The 
only "strategic" Trust Territory established, it allows 
the U.S., in its administration of the islands, to by-
pass the General Assembly which has increasingly 
supported independence and liberation movements. 
The U.S. reports directly to the Security Council 
where it retains veto power. The Micronesian govern-
ments are now in the final stages of deciding their 
future political status, a process that has spanned 
more than 13 years. 
Unlike Micronesia's three previous colonial rulers 
(Spain, Germany and Japan) the U.S. has not ex-
ploited Micronesia for economic gain. Rather, the is-
Continued on page 8 
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Continued from page 7 
lands have been used for their military value. While 
ignoring its U.N. mandate to develop the islands 
towards self-sufficiency and to "protect the inhabit-
ants against the loss of their lands and resources," the 
U.S. was busy blowing up 66 atomic and hydrogen 
bombs in the Marshall Islands. During the 12 year nu-
clear testing program, 6 islands were blown off the 
face of the earth, while many others were rendered 
uninhabitable. Moreover, hundreds of Marshallese 
citizens today suffer from the severe aftereffects of 
radiation exposure. 
Further, during the l 950's, the CIA ran a secret 
counterinsurgency base on Saipan, training Chinese 
nationalists to retake the China mainland. And since 
the early l 960's, the Kwajalein Missile Range in the 
Marshall Islands, used to test all of the U.S. 's long 
range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, has been at 
the center of all U.S. nuclear war strategies. 
In contrast to the earlier I apanese administration, 
economic activity in Micronesia during the l 950's 
was virtually non-existent. But the Kennedy admin-
istration dramatically reversed past policies and in the 
early l 960's millions of dollars and hundreds of 
federal programs began pouring into the islands. Re-
acting to pressure from the U.N. and anti-colonial 
sentiment sweeping the world, Kennedy instituted 
these changes. But according to National Security 
Memorandum 145, the goal was to bring Micronesia 
into a "permanent relationship" with the U.S. by ac-
celerating "development of the area to bring its po-
litical, economic and social standards into line with 
an eventual permanent association." 
Today, more than $130 million flows into Micro-
nesia annually for a population of 130,000. That this 
"aid" policy has succeeded is evident in the large a-
mount of aid, but lacking economic base, although 
the Islanders were once self-sufficient. Indeed, Micro-
nesia is now dependent on the U.S. for about 90 per 
cent of its aid. In this atmosphere of economic de-
pendence, the Micronesians began negotiating with 
the U.S. in 1969 to change their status as a Trust 
Territory. 
During the 13 years of often stormy political 
status talks between the U.S. and Micronesia, the U.S. 
has worked to maintain ultimate control of Micro-
nesia. Schlesinger described the U.S. view of the po-
litical status talks as "only to change the form of (the) 
agreement while retaining the basic objective and re-
sponsibility we have had for nearly 30 years." To ac-
complish this, in the early l 970's the U.S. offered the 
Micronesians a commonwealth package, similar to 
Puerto Rico's political status. This was flatly rejected 
by island leaders in favor of independence, except in 
the Marianas where there was sentiment for closer ties 
with the U.S. With the U.S. military position in Asia 
weakening, the Pentagon was anxious to firm up a 
strong "fallback" position, which Micronesian in-
dependence demands were threatening. In late 1972, 
the U.S. quickly entered into separate negotiations 
with the Marianas. U.S. plans to turn Tinian Island 
into a key Air Force base became a major focus of 
the talks. 
Commented one defense planners in 1974: "Given 
the changing regional power structures of Pacific-Asia, 
and the probability of major military adjustments by 
the United States from our present forward positions, 
it is quite conceivable that in ten or twenty years the 
entire U.S. Pacific presence will be centered on a 
Guam-Tinian axis." 
Opposition from Tinian farmers and students, 
however, stymied U.S. plans to take the entire 40-
square mile island and relocate the 900 residents. The 
U.S. agreed to reduce its plans to 2/3 of the island, 
but it still includes the best farming land on the island. 
A commonwealth agreement was signed by U.S. and 
Marianas leaders in 1975 and in a hurried plebiscite, 
78 per cent of the voters approved the new status. 
The agreements allows for construction of the base at 
any time. Although no construction has officially 
begun, the U.S. Congress in November 1982 voted 
the $33 million necessary to exercise its SO-year lease 
on Tinian land, paving the way for the base. 
Tinian has been described by a Trust Territory 
agronomist as having the most fertile farming land in 
all of Micronesia. But a 1974 social impact study by 
the U.S. Air Force commented that if the base is built, 
"agriculture activities will be severely limited and the 
present standard of living will deteriorate ... The 
breakdown of family ties, personal conflicts and so-
cial problems because of urbanization, competition 
and cultural transition will increase ... " 
Status Neaotiations Solidify U.S. Control 
Since World War II, the prime U.S. interest in 
Micronesia has been strategic "denial" - that is, the 
power to deny entry to the islands by any other na-
tion for military purposes. But with the eroding of 
U.S. power in Asia, U.S. planners began looking at the 
Micronesian islands along the Asian periphery as sites 
for active military installations. A 1973 U.S. Army 
War College report concluded that: "The only feasi-
ble Callback position (from Asia) is unquestionably 
located in Micronesia, where island bases, unlike 
those in S.E. Asia, would be under permanent U.S. 
control . . . Palau has excellent anchorages, Ponape 
and Babelthuap (sic) have land areas in excess of 100 
square miles and are suitable for nuclear weapons 
storage and training areas ... " 
Bases in Belau and the Marianas became a focus of 
U.S. attention during the political status talks. Mean-
while, the focus of American economic activity in 
Micronesia became the building of basic infrastruc-
ture, which, some writers observed, was designed to 
support the military. Military civic action teams 
began working in all parts of the Trust Territory on 
goodwill development projects. Roger Gale, the for-
mer Director of Friends of Micronesia, pointed out 
that "an interesting pattern emerged. Army engine-
ering teams became responsible for civic action in the 
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Marshalls where Anti-Ballistic Missile testing is done 
under the Army, Navy Seabees work in the Carolines 
where naval port facilities and Marine training sites 
are planned, and Air Force teams operate in the 
Marianas where reconstruction of World War II air-
bases on Tinian and Saipan are in the cards." 
But the U.S. was working covertly as well to insure 
military control of Micronesia . In 1973, Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger had directed the CIA to "assess 
the possibility of exerting covert influence on key ele-
ments of the Micronesian independence movement 
where necessary to support U.S. strategic objectives." 
Later the intelligence agencies were caught bugging, 
hiring as informants and attempting bribery of key 
Micronesian leaders. A U.S. Congressional investiga-
tion into the CIA activity reported that the CIA re-
cruited "Micronesian residents, some with affiliations 
with Micronesian political entities," and that at least 
one of the informants "served on one of the island 
government entities developing a compact with the 
U.S . as to future status." 
The chief U.S. negotiator, F. Haydn Williams, in-
sisted that he was unaware of the CIA activities and 
was not provided any information. Nevertheless, 
Williams, when appointed by President Nixon to be 
U.S. Ambassador to Micronesia , was the President of 
the Asia Foundation, an organization created by the 
CIA in the l 950's. 
Because of the Micronesians overwhelming de-
pendency on American aid, they have been forced to 
accept a status that falls far short of independence. 
From the mid-l 970's on, the status talks focused on 
developing a "Compact of Free Association," which 
would grant the Micronesians internal and foreign af-
fairs control, to the extent this doesn't conflict with 
overriding U.S. authority for defense of the islands. 
. ...ii.&. Chief Aglfaru of Faranlap Atoll In 
... this picture from 1946, has just 
, received an American flag. 
The common experience of foreign 
administration has greatly enhanced 
.. cooperation between various Micronesian 
countries despite linguistic and 
cultural differences. 
_ ..... ~·· .. . (From Micronesia 's Yesterday, published 
~ • -_. • ..... ~ .. - by the Trust Territory Department 
" ~ • ...: . ""of Education, Sa/pan, 1973.) 
.. ~ - J ',:}' · 
Up to 1980, the pact was negotiated to last for a 
period of 15 years. Suddenly in late 1980, influential 
members of the U.S. Senate demanded that military 
denial rights be guaranteed to the U.S. in "perpe-
tuity." The Micronesian negotiators were severely 
alienated, viewing this as a last minute demand that 
significantly altered tne agreement . Faced with strong 
opposition, the U.S. negotiators dropped their de-
mand for denial to 100 years. 
The Reagan administration, however, has taken a 
much stronger public position than earlier administra-
tions on military rights, demanding denial powers for 
the "longest possible period." The Compact is well 
suited for the Pentagon because it ostensibly grants 
the Micronesians autonomy in internal and foreign 
affairs, while providing the U.S. with absolute author-
ity for military affairs, including veto power over any 
Micronesian action in conflict with this authority. In 
exchange, the Micronesians will receive hundreds of 
millions of dollars during the life of the Compact - a 
period of 15, 30 and 50 years for the Federated 
States, Marshalls and Belau respectively. 
Clearly long term military denial, with guaranteed 
funding aid for only a short period, will undermine 
Micronesia's future bargaining position. Despite this, 
faced with severe Reagan administration budget cuts, 
beginning in May and ending in October 1982, the 
Marshalls, Belau and the Federated States all signed 
the Compact with permanent military denial agree-
ments. 
The Batde for Belau 
Shortly after the U.S . announced specific plans for 
military use of about 30 per cent of land in Belau in 
Continued on page 10 
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1972, more than 50 traditional and elected leaders 
declared their opposition to the plans: "Whereas, the 
people of Palau have no desire to have military instal-
lations and personnel on Palauan land . .. because 
this could result in suffering for human beings within 
or without Palau . .. We hereby declare that we are 
unequivocally opposed to the use of land in Palau by 
the United States military ... " 
U.S. plans, outlined in the Compact, include use of 
32,000 acres of land on Babeldaob Island for jungle 
warfare training, weapons storage and other purposes; 
the main commercial port in Koror; the 2 airports in 
Angaur and Babeldaob; and access rights of way in or 
near four villages on Babeldaob for troops, tanks and 
amphibious landing craft on training exercises. 
Military plans are in stark contrast to the subsist-
ence living of the majority of Belauan people. Particu-
larly as the plans to extend the Angaur runway from 
9,000 to 12,000 feet will destroy current taro farms 
on the small 3 square mile island. Moreover, under 
normal conditions the U.S. is granted "the right to 
take reasonable and necessary measures for (the) es-
tablishment, operation and maintenance" of the port, 
airfields and Babeldaob military bases. These wide-
ranging powers can be used to regulate and disrupt 
day-to-day activities of the Belauan people such as 
farming or fishing, if in conflict with military oper-
ations. The military will have rights of way in or near 
four villages for landing assault troops and equipment 
for war training on Babeldaob. Indeed, the 30,000 
acre jungle warfare area encompasses all of the nu-
merous villages in 5 states on Babeldaob. 
Additionally, the U.S. is allowed to store nuclear 
weapons in Belau on ships or aircraft transiting Belau 
" during a national emergency declared by the Presi-
dent of the United States, during a state of war de-
clared by the U.S. Congress, in order to defend against 
an actual or impending armed attack on the United 
States or Palau including the threat of such an attack, 
or during a time of other military necessity as deter-
mined by the Government of the United States." The 
language of the Compact is misleading because it gives 
the impression that nuclear weapons will not be 
allowed into Belau except in extreme emergencies. 
But Belauans ask "couldn't the storage of nuclear 
weapons in Belau always be considered a 'military 
necessity'"? And it is the U.S. which retains ultimate 
power to decide when nuclear weapons will be stored 
in Belau. 
Radioactive waste disposal, with few restrictions, 
is also allowed under the Compact. Again, the tech-
nical language used appears to prevent the U.S. f,.om 
dumping low or high level wastes in the waters or 
lands of Belau. In fact, however, the Compact allows 
the storage of high level radioactive waste in certain 
parts of Belau if below a certain quantity and the dis-
posal of low level radioactive wastes into the ocean 
with an Environmental Protection Agency permit. 
Given the Reagan administration attempts to gut EPA 
safety regulations governing toxic wastes, the EPA is 
unlikely to provide much protection for the Belauans. 
But opposition to another threat took precedence 
over the military plans during the mid-1970's. Major 
Japanese corporations, including Nissho-Iwai and the 
Industrial Bank of Japan, along with U.S. and Iranian 
interests planned a massive oil storage/refinery /trans-
shipment superport (CTS) for Belau. Belau's natural 
deep water harbors, location astride the new super-
tanker route from the Middle East to Japan, small 
population and lax environmental laws all contrib-
uted to the selection of Belau over numerous other 
sites. But the most important consideration, accord-
ing to Japanese investors, was the expectation that 
Belau would be controlled by the U.S. military for at 
least a generation to come. 
Not suprisingly, key military officials endorsed the 
multi-billion dollar superport project. Admiral Kent 
Carroll, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Marianas, 
visited Belau in late 197 5 and commented: "The U.S. 
is certainly not opposed to it .. .I predict the prelimi-
nary studies will show it's a viable concept .. . I think 
it will be difficult for the Palauans to turn down .. . " 
An EPA memo on the superport noted that "the 
Defense Department likes the idea, and sees it as 
supportive of their own elaborate designs on Palau as 
a military installation." In fact, military researcher 
Robert Aldridge, who speculates the Navy wants 
Belau as a forward base for the Trident submarine, 
suggested the public support military officials gave to 
the superport was a cover for their own plans for 
Belau. 
The military demonstrated that it was more than 
casually interested in this project. In March, 1976, 
Guam's Pacific Daily News exposed Navy Intelligence 
attempts to bribe the High Chief of Belau and a Daily 
News reporter to spy on people in connection with 
U.S. military plans. The offers were turned down, but 
there may have been other takers. 
Despite the involvement of influential Belauan 
businessmen, who assured the Japanese, Iranian and 
American businessmen of their "active support and 
cooperation" in developing the superport, strong 
grass roots opposition spread throughout Belau. The 
opposition was fueled, in part, by statements of 
American officials, such as Naval Commander David 
Burt, who said during a 1976 visit to Belau: "There 
are millions of people in Japan and only 14,000 in 
Palau. It may be necessary to sacrifice those 14,000." 
Belauans were faced with the prospect of 3 9 per 
cent to 74 per cent of their 188 square miles of land 
being taken over by the military and the multina-
tional oil industry. Summing up many Belauans feel-
ings, a petition from Belau's traditional leaders said 
the superport "would cause changes in the economic, 
social, cultural and environmental aspects of Palauan 
life of a magnitude unprecedented in Palau's history 
with the possible exception of World War II." 
The superport was one of the first Micronesian 
issues to spark widespread international outcry from 


















In October, 1979 Palau voters overwhelmingly rejected a "sanitized" constitu-
tion that was written to satisfy U.S. objections to the nuclear ban and other 
provisions in the first Constitution. 
Together with the "Save Palau Organization", this 
opposition forced the Japanese to shelve the project, 
possibly only temporarily. The Japanese government 
which wants to increase its oil storage capacity as a 
hedge against future embargoes, has not found the 
needed increase in oil storage capacity inside Japan . 
Faced with strong citizens movements, the Japanese 
government has decided that the export of unwanted 
industry is the easiest way to solve its energy probl-
ems. 
But it was not alone the superport opposition that 
prevented the Japanese from developing the port. In 
1979, a popularly elected Constitutional Convention 
drafted the now highly publicized constitution 
banning entry , storage or use of nuclear weapons or 
waste in Belau without the express approval of 75 
per cent of the votes cast in a referendum on this 
question. The constitution also banned eminent 
domain powers of the government if it was for the 
"benefit of a foreign entity", a clause clearly aimed at 
stopping the military and superport project . 
The U.S. State Department quickly opposed the 
constitution, stating that the "proposed language 
could cause problems of the utmost gravity for the 
U.S." The U.S. pressed the Belau Legislature, stating 
the constitution was "incompatible" with the Com-
pact of Free Association, then in draft form, and thus 
had to be modified. U.S . Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt 
flew to Belau meeting in a closed session with the 
Legislature while hundreds of Belauans demonstrated 
outside the Legislature, protesting U.S. interference 
with their right to self-determine their future. 
Rosenblatt made it clear to the legislators that the 
U.S. would make no financial commitments for an 
independent political status. 
The economic threat was clear to many of the leg-
islators who then voted to void the constitution. The 
Peoples Committee for the Palau Constituti.on, con-
sisting of Con~on members, teachers, traditional 
leaders, students and others, formed to support the 
constitution. In spite of the Legislature's action, the 
scheduled July 9 referendum went ahead with U.N. 
observers, and the constitution was ratified by the un-
precedented margin of 92 per cent. 
A short while later, the U.S. appointed Chief 
Justice of the Trust Territory High Court ruled that 
the Legislature's action to void the constitution was 
legal, thus cancelling the results of the popular refer-
endum. A nine member team was appointed by the 
Legislature which re-drafted the constitution, deleting 
all the provisions objected to by the U.S. 
For this revised constitution, the Belau Legislature 
appropriated $100,000 for "political education" of 
Belau's 7 ,000 voters, although it had refused to re-
lease the $26,000 needed for education on the original 
version. Nevertheless, on October 23, 1979 Belauans 
went to the polls again and 70 per cent rejected this 
revised constitution, demonstrating their support for 
the original nuclear free version. One observer noted, 
"The Palauans ate at the barbeques but voted their 
conscience." In a major political turn around, pro-
nuclear free constitution candidates swept U.S. 
supporters out of office during elections at this time. 
And a year later, on July 9, 1980, the original consti-
tution was again ratified by 78 per cent of the voters. 
The Compact of Free Association is fundamentally 
at odds with the Belau constitution because it grants 
the U.S. the right, with few restriction, to use the 
ports and airfields for nuclear warships and aircraft, 
to store conventional and nuclear weapons on the is-
lands, and to use the islands for a jungle warfare train-
ing base. There is speculation that Belau could be-
come an Asian counterpart to the U.S. Army's School 
of the Americans in Panama, where tens of thousands 
of military personnel from repressive Latin American 
Continued on page 14 
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U.S. Military ''Rights'' in Palau i1 
U.S. PLANS FOR MILITARY 
BASES IN PALAU 
From the Compac t: 
..... ::::)'•; 
(. ... /{ 
.... i 
lr~ ..... 
Land Use and Operating 
Rights Within Defens e Sites 
Article IV 
"1. The defense sites prouided by the Gouernment of Palau 
to the Gouernment of the United States described in the 
attached annexes are designated for the following 
categories of uses: 
"(a) Exclusiue·use areas - areas which are reserued 
exclusiue/y for use by the Gouernment of the Unit eel States, 
subject to the /imitations set forth in this Agreement ; 
"(b) Joint ·use areas areas which mav be tfsed jo1n1/v 
by the Gouernment of Palau and the Gouemment of the 
Un ited States, subject to the limitations ser forth m this 
Agreement; 
"(c) Non·exclusiue·use areas areas for intermittent 
use by the Gouernment of the United States. subiect to the 
limitations set forth in this Agreement .. . " 
Exclusive -Use Areas: 
I . Malakai Harbor: 40 acres o f dry a nd s ub-
merged land 
2. Ngardmau: 1,400 acre s 
3 . Ngaremlengui: 600 acres 
4 . Airai Airport: 65 acres 
5 . Angaur Airport: 65 acres 
"The Gouernment of the United States shall permit the 
presence of nuclear weapons in Palau only incident to 
transit and ouerflight, during a national emergency 
declared by the President of the United States, during a 
state of war declared by the Congress of the United States, 
in order to defend against an actual or impending armed 
attack on the United States or Palau including a threat of 
such attack. or during a time of other milttary necessity as 
determined by the Gouernment of the United States ... >) 
a 
Military Use A nd 
Operating Rights Within 
Exclusive-Use Areas 
Article V 
"l. The Gouernment of the United States has access to 
and unrestricted control of all exc/usiue-use areas, includ· 
ing the right to control entry to and exit from any or all 
excil1siue-use areas and the right to take reasonable and 
necessary measures for their establishment, use and 
ope rat ion. The Gouernment of the United States may take, 
within the exclusiue use areas and within the seabeds, 
water areas and air space adjacent to or in the uicinity of 
the exclusiue-use areas reasonable and necessary 
measures for their use, security and defense. These 
measures include the right: 
"(a) To maintain the exclusiue use areas and to 
construct structures and improuements thereon; 
"(b) 1o improue and deepen the harbors, channels, 
entrances, and anchorages, to dredge and fill, and 
generally to fit the premises to their intended use; 
"(c) To control, so far as may be required for the efficient 
operation of the exclusiue·use areas, anchorages and 
moorings, the mouements of ships and waterborne craft, 
aircraft operations and land mouements ... 
"2. In conducting actiuities in exclusiue-use areas, the 
Gouernment of the United States shall use its best efforts 
to: 
"(a) Auoid interferences with commercial actiuities in 
Palau; 
"(b) Auoid interferences with access by fishermen to 
shoreline areas; ... 
"(e) Minimize damage to the terrain and to reef areas; 
"(f) Auoid unreasonable harm to the enuironment, 
including water areas .. .'\ 
"Minimize" damage to lands and reefs and "avoid 
unreasonable" harm to the environmen t are 
ambiguous terms used in A rticle 5, Section 2. Nor are 
Palauans given any means for overseeing or enforcing 
the U.S. "best efforts" to protect the lands and reefs. 
l 
1 
[f the Compact is Implemented 
I 
1 · 
From the Compact: 
Non-Exclusive Use Areas: 
a) 30,000 acres in northern Babeldaob; 
b) 4 beach access rights of way in or near 
Ngiwal, Ulimang, Melekeok and 
Keklau 




"2. During periods of use the Government of the United 
States may, within non-exclusive-use areas, control, so far 
as may be required for efficient conduct of the planned use, 
the use of anchorages and moorings, the movement of 
ships and waterborne craft, aircraft operations and land 
movements. 
"3. In conducting activities in non-exclusive-use areas, the 
Government of the United States shall, in consultation with 
the Government of Palau, use its best efforts to: ... 
"(e) Minimize damage to the terrain and to reef areas 
and restore, where practicable, such areas to their prior 
state; 
"(f) Avoid unreasonable harm to the environment , 
including water areas; 
'' 11. The Government of the United States may invite 
members of the armed forces of other countries to use 
defense sites pursuant to this Agreement, in conjunction 
with and under the control of the United States Armed 
Forces. Use by units of the armed forces of other countries 
of such defense sites, other than for transit and overflight 
purposes, ! hall be subject to consultation with and, in the 
case of major units, approval by the Government of Palau." 
The Government of the United States moy use 
nuclear power plants or reactors in Palau on m1/rtory ships 
or vessels under the ownership or control of tl>e GoL'em 
ment of the United States .. Y 
From the Compact: 
Joint-Use Areas: 
I. All anchorages in Malakai Harbor; 
2 . Roads connecting the two exclusive-use 
areas in Ngardmau and Ngaremlengui; 
3. 555 acres in and around Airai Airport; 
4 . 555 acres in and around Angaur 
Airport 
Military Use and Operating 
Rights Within Joint-U!>e Areas 
Article VI 
"J. The Government of the United States shall huue 
access to and use of joint·L1Se areas, mcludmg the right to 
lake reasonable cmd necessary measures for their c i;tcil> 
lishment, operation cmd maintenance 
"(a) After consL1ltation with the Governmenr o f Pololl, 
the> Go1)ernment of the United Stotc'-> moy toke. w1th111 
thec,e orco:o. and u.:ithtn the seabeds. Lt·oter oreos and wr 
:o.pace acl1acent 10 or in the uic1n11_v of these oreas, 
reasonable cmd necessary measures for rheir use. secunry 
and defense ... 
Annex 0 
2. (The U.S. is granted) "Joint use of enrire airfield area 
including right to extend runway to 12,000 feet. and the 
right to improve to meet military requirements and specifi 
cations. If any extension of the runway displaces existing 
taro growing area, the Government of the United States 
shall provide for the construction of a comparable taro-
growing area on such land as is provided for that purpose 
by either the owner of the displaced taro-growing area or 
by any government entity in Palau. Any runway extension 
shall provide for land access between the lands on either 
side of the defense site." 
Article 7, Section 5 states that Palauans will have 
"full and free" use of the 30,000 acres on Babeloab. But 
Palauans will only be able to build permanent 
structures after "consultation" with the United States 
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regimes have trained . Belau's location near the Philip-
pines, South Korea, Taiwan and other Asian nations 
makes it well suited for this. 
Of equal importance is the possible future use of 
Belau as a staging ground for intervention of U.S. 
forces into Asia. Guam was the launching site for 
dozens of daily B-52 bombing raids during the Indo-
china war, and Belau could be used as a backup for 
similar purposes. 
Even in the limited capacity of a transit base for 
nuclear warships and aircraft puts Belau squarely on 
the map as a nuclear target. Belauans are fearful of 
this, having experienced the devastating U.S. attacks 
on Japanese military fortifications in their islands 
during World War II. Like the Americans, the Japan-
ese promised that the bases would defend Belauans. 
The result, however, was just the opposite, as the 
Japanese military bases drew American attacks. 
Nevertheless, the Pentagon is confident Belau 
voters will support the Compact and has sent numer-
rous Defense planners on tours of the proposed bases. 
One resident of Ngardmau Village on Babeldaob Is-
land, where the military plans a munitions storage 
base, commented: " No one has consulted with us to 
say you are the landowners and we want to talk 
with you. All kinds of people come in making surveys 
of the land and ocean but they never tell us what 
they're doing. " 
In view of the strong support shown for the 
nuclear free constitution passage of the Compact 
would appear impossible. But in the final version of 
the Compact, signed by U.S. and Belau negotiators on 
August 26, 1982, the U.S. has attempted to lure in 
more Belauans by offering a greater financial aid 
package then previously agreed . Instead of limiting 
economic assistance to 1 S years, the U.S. has agreed 
to provide funds totalling about $23 million annually 
for SO years, plus four payments of SS million each as 
military "impact assistance". This represents a sub-
stantial increase in Belau's current budget and may be 
appealing to government workers who comprise the 
majority of the work force and are threatened by 
Reagan's budget cuts. 
If the Compact is approved, with its 50-year mil-
itary pact, and permanent military denial rights for 
the U.S., Japanese business interests are certain to re-
new attempts to construct the oil superport in Belau. 
As an American Embassy official in Japan said , 
"Without the protection of the U.S. Navy, it will 
never be built. " 
Biographical note: Giff Johnson is a free lance writer 
who has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, The Nation, Pacific Magazine, Pacific 
Islands Monthly and others. He recently returned 
from a 3-month research trip throughout Micronesia. 
(Excerpted from AMPO - Japan/Asia Quarterly 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1982. A reprint of the entire 
article is available. See page 22.) 
' 't...~ 
Palauans calling for a postponement of the February 10 plebiscite, citing " in-
adequate and misleading" pol itical education on the Compact. 
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In 1979 ... 
How America Killed a Constitution 
By Francisco T. Uludong 
IN THE REMOTE Pacific islands 
of Micronesia, the United States is 
undercutting its own professed 
ideals of democracy and human 
rights ... 
The most flagrant example is in 
Palau, an island district of nearly 
15,000 residents. Shortly, the 
citizens of Palau will go to the polls 
to vote on a new constitution, 
written to U.S. specifications after 
the Carter administration, acting 
through an illegally convened local 
legislature, succeeded in killing an 
earlier constitution which the 
people overwhelmingly ratified in 
July. 
The story is complicated and 
almost unknown outside the 
islands. It began six months ago. 
In April , a popularly elected 
contitutional convention, 
approved and partly funded by the 
U.S. government, completed a 
constitution which, among other 
things, would ban storage in Palau 
of nuclear weapons. nuclear 
wastes and other deadly weapons 
of war, establish a 200-mile 
territorial jurisdiction and impose 
stringent controls on acquisition of 
lands for U.S. military bases. The 
United States, which wants to 
preserve transit rights for its air-
craft and nuclear-powered ships 
and to continue to set aside land 
for possible future bases, opposed 
these provisions during the 
convention. Shortly after it 
adjourned, U.S. Ambassador Peter 
Rosenblatt traveled to Palau and. 
in a closed-door, heavily guarded 
session with the Palau legislature, 
restated the strong American 
opposition to the constitution. 
In June, the legislature, meeting 
without the ?.5-member quorum 
required by its charter, voted to 
nullify the constitution and a 
popular vote on it scheduled for 
July 9 on the grounds that the 
document failed to meet U.S. 
objectives. A pro-constitution 
group, composed of nearly the 
entire convention that wrote the 
constitution, filed a lawsuit to void 
the legislature's action. After the 
Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands 
'°° 
controversy went to the courts, 
American authorities in the trust 
territory allowed the referendum to 
take place under U.N. observation. 
On July 9, the constitution was 
ratified by an unprecendented 
margin of 92 to 8 percent despite 
intimidation, including physical 
threats, against the U.N. observers 
and the public. After the vote, 
however, U.S. High Commissioner 
Adrian Winkel, an appointee of 
President Carter and the highest 
American representative in the 
trust territory, permitted the 
legislature to establish a 
commission to write a new 
constitution satisfactory to the 
U.S government. Later in the 
month, the chief justice of the Trust 
Territory High Court, an American 
appointed by the Interior Depart-
ment, upheld the legislature's 
action to nullify the constitution 
and the referendum results. 
In August, the legislature-ap-
pointed commission completed its 
work on the second constitution. 
On Sept. 4, Palau an voters again 
went to the polls, this time to elect a 
new legislature. All but one of the 
28 seats were won by candidates 
running on a platform to revive the 
first constitution. 
11 Out CoH - Tht Wuhln1i. P'o•\ 
The United Nations, which 
observed the July 9 voting, has not 
been Invited to witness next 
Tuesday's referendum, which was 
inspired by Rosenblatt and which 
the legislature has spent 
thousands of dollars to influence. 
The Carter administration 
argues that the second constitut-
tion is necessary if the United 
States is going to enter into a free 
association with Palau. Negotia-
tions on this new semi-inde-
pendent status, however, have not 
been completed; it would be unfair, 
therefore, for the United States to 
require that the Palauans design a 
constitution that fits the U.S. 
conception of free association. 
(On October 23, 1979 Palauan 
voters rejected this "revised" 
Constitution by a 70% margin. In 
July 1980, the original nuclear-free 
Constitution was reapproved by a 
78% majority. -Ed. note) 
Francisco Uludong, a native of 
Palau, was formerly Saipan bureau 
chief of the Pacific Daily News. a 
Gannett newspaper. In 1979, he 
was on leave as a Dag Hammar-
skjold fellow at the United Nations 
in New York. 
From the Washington Post, 
October 21, 1979 
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Grass Roots People Say 'No' to Military 
e of Palav hqve alread_!! 
eir Constilution ! 
--i [) I i\ K 
92% of the voters ratified the Palau Constitution in July, 1979. Never-
theless, under pressure from the U.S., the Palau Legislature called a 
second referendum for a vote on a " revised" Constitution. Written to 
U.S. specifications, it was rejected on October 23, 1979. 
by David Wallechinsky 
The Republic of Belau in Micro-
nesia was the first nation to create 
a constitution that bars nuclear 
weapons and materials from cross-
ing its borders. But the government 
of the United States could have 
other plans for Belau : (1) a 30,000-
acre jungle warfare training base 
that would occupy one-third of the 
main island of Babeldaob; (2) 
expansion of two airfields for use 
by U.S. and other foreign military 
planes , including fast-speed , 
heavy transport jets; (3) exclusive 
use of a large part of Malakai 
Harbor, possibly as a service stop 
for the Trident nuclear submarine; 
and (4) a 2000-acre storage base 
for nuclear and conventional 
weapons. The people of Belau ask: 
How would you like to have a 
training base or an ammo dump in 
your neighborhood? 
Belau, always in demand among 
colonial powers, was captured 
from Germany by the Japanese in 
World War I. In 1944, the Japanese 
themselves were driven out by the 
U.S. The Japanese occupation had 
been oppressive, but Belau did 
develop a diversified economy, 
deriving revenues from mining, 
agriculture, fishing and small 
industries. Also, the streets of 
Koror, the capital of Belau, were 
paved. 
After World War II , the UN 
assigned the Pacific Islands of 
Micronesia-including Belau-to 
the U.S. as a trust territory. But 
because of their strategic impor-
tance, there was little interest in 
helping the islands regain 
autonomy. 
As one of their first acts, U.S. 
military leaders ordered the roads 
and 95 percent of all substantial 
buildings destroyed, asserting that 
they were reminders of Japanese 
imperialism. Today, Belau has 
fewer paved roads than it did 45 
years ago. The once-thriving 
economy has given way to a 
welfare state in which the No. 1 
industry is government. Belau has 
1200 government employees 
whose salaries consume 80 
percent of the national budget. If 
the U.S. had the same proportion 
of government bureaucrats, there 
would be 18 million people on the 
federal payroll instead of 3 million. 
Financial assistance from the 
U.S. has provided cars, TVs, laun-
dromats with video games, sugar-
















brands of deodorant. This dubious 
prospertity has been created 
artificially through salaries to 
government employees ratherthan 
by developing a self-sustaining 
economy. 
But despite their strong feelings , 
the inhabitants of the remote 
islands were in a dilemma. On the 
one hand, they didn't want the U.S. 
military presence polluting their 
a i r, unsettling their homes , 
disrupting their fishing and 
destroying the beauty of their land. 
On the other hand, the people of 
Belau had become dependent on 
American handouts. 
United States officials insist that 
Belau 's const itution can be 
modified by a three-fourth 's 
majority vote of the people. So 
confident of this is the U.S. that, 
residents say, the military has 
already laid the groundwork for the 
militarization of Belau. Aichi 
Kumangai, the village magistrate 
of Ngardmau, told me how he was 
visited by military officials in 1980. 
His clan owns half the land that the 
Pentagon has designated for 
munitions storage. The officials 
explained their plan for fencing off 
the area they wanted. They also 
warned the villagers that they 
would have to stay at least three 
miles away whenever munitions 
were being loaded or unloaded. 
Kumangai told me that the people 
of Ngardmau objected immed-
iately and that they remain 
opposed to the plan. 
The U.S. authorities have been 
campaigning to win Belau 's 
approval of the compact. They 
have argued that military bases 
would protect Belau from invasion 
by the USSR. But older citizens of 
Belau remind the young that this 
same argument had been used by 
the Japanese to persuade Belau to 
allow them to build military bases 
against possible invasion by the 
United States . Instead of 
protecting Belau, they actually 
drew the attention of the 
Americans, and Belau was 
shattered by warfare, highlighted 
by the bloody battle of Peleliu. The 
people of Belau fear that the 
presence of U.S. military bases 
Continued on page 17 
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Legal Implications of Palau Vote 
by Joel Miles 
Months have passed since the 
plebiscite on the Compact of Free 
Association between the Republic 
of Palau and the United States, but 
because of the conflicting 
interpretations of the results of that 
plebiscite, the final outcome may 
eventually be decided in 
international courts of law. In light 
of this problem, the Micronesia 
Support Committee requested 
Roger S. Clark, Professor of 
International Law at Rutgers 
University, an internationally 
respected expert on international 
law, for an analysis of the issues. 
Prof. Clark kindly responded with a 
ten-page memorandum, prepared 
with the collaboration of experts in 
constitutional law and other 
attorneys familiar with the 
Compact and its history. This 
article summarizes and comments 
on Prof. Clark's memorandum. 
The final results of the plebiscite 
were as follows: 
The Compact: 
Yes-4,452 (62%); No-2,715 
The Nuclear Provision: 
Yes-3,717 (53%); No-3,309 
The official United States State 
Department position on this result, 
as stated in a press release on 
February 23, 1983, is that the 
second question was "an internal 
referendum question," and that 
" the Palauan authorities must now 
devise an acceptable method of 
reconciling their constitutional 
provisions to comply with the 
Continued from page 16 
similarly would make them a target 
of Soviet missiles. As Otaor, the 
village chief, said: "We have 
"Surely the real challenge is to modify the Compact in such a way as 
to reconcile it with the Constitution. The Constitution is the fundamen-
law of Palau. It was developed in fulfillment of the requirement of 
Article 76 of the [U.N.) Charter that the administering authority pro-
mote the development of self-government. The referendum at which it 
was adopted was observed by this body. I am not aware that the United 
States has ever modified its Constitution in order to engage in inter-
national relations. It has always expected other potential parties to 
treaties to come to terms with the United States Constitution. In the 
multilateral sphere it has often entered into treaties with reservations 
protecting its constitutional position. It often forgoes treaty relations 
for constitutional reasons. Why should Palau behave otherwise?" 
-Roger S. Clark, Distinguished Professor of Law, 
Rutgers Un iversity. U.N. Trusteesh ip Council , 
May 20, 1983. 
mandate of the Palauan electorate 
for free association with the United 
States." According to Prof. Clark, 
"This language suggests that the 
Palauans must now find a way 
either to change their constitution 
or to try again to obtain voter 
approval for the Compact package 
as negotiated." He adds, "This 
seems unlikely. " MSC agrees. 
The government and people of 
Palau have consistently opposed 
the use, storage, or disposal of 
nuclear weapons, power plants, or 
their wastes since the issue was 
first raised in 1972. The February 
plebiscite was the fourth time in as 
many years that the Palau an voters 
have gone on record at the polls in 
support of the anti-nuclear 
provisions of their constitution. 
Does the United States govern-
ment really believe that the people 
suffered through a war that was not 
of our making, and we do not want 
it to happen again." 
United States officials deny 
charges that they intend to build a 
Trident submarine base in Belau. 
Zeder called the idea "the most 
ridiculous thing I've ever read," 
arguing that the range of the 
Trident makes such a base unnec-
essary and that it would be too 
expensive to build . But the 
Belauans are understandably 
wary. If the U.S. is not planning to 
build a Trident base, they ask, then 
of Palau will now change their 
position overn ight, or are they 
simply trying to cloud the issue? 
The basic issue at hand is 
whether the "nuclear prov ision" 
(described on the ballot as the 
" agreement on radioact ive, 
chemical and biological sub-
stances concluded pursuant to 
Section 314 of the Compact," and 
referred to by Prof. Clark as "The 
Radioactive Agreement") is truly 
an "internal" question, or whether 
the Radioactive Agreement is in 
fact an integral and inseparable 
part of the Compact of Free 
Association . According to Prof. 
Clark, the two are inseparable, and 
the failure of the Radioactive 
Ag reement to obtain a 75% 
majority of the votes cast "means 
that the Compact package ... was 
defeated in the p lebiscite." He 
Continued on page 18 
why won't it add a clause to that 
effect to the Compact of Free 
Association? 
Speaking for his village, wh ich is 
unanimously opposed to the 
military presence, Ngirturong 
Otaor sent this formal message 
from the other side of the world: 
"Please convey to the U.S. peop le 
and government that we do not 
want the U.S. military to come." 
(Excerpted from Parade Magazine 
October 24, 1982.) 
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concludes, therefore, that rather 
than continu ing their fut i le 
attempts to force the Palauans to 
change their constitution, "the 
time Is In fact ripe for the United 
States to consult with Palau In 
order to find a way to reconcile the 
status of free association 
apparently desired by the voters 
with the provisions of the Palau 
Constitution." This opinion is 
based on "( A) the relevant 
provisions of the Palau Constitu-
tion ; (B) the language contained 
on the ballot ; and (C) the 
provisions of Article I of the 
Radioactive Agreement." 
The so- called " Palauan-
American agreement" referred to 
by the U.S. press release as an 
" internal referendum question" is 
in reality, says Clark, "an amalgam 
of four separate but interlocking 
provisions of the Compact 
package: 
Section 311 of the Compact 
Section 312 of the Compact 
Section 314 of the Compact 
The Radioactive Agreement" 
All four of these provisions do 
allow " use, testing, storage or 
disposal of nuclear, toxic 
chemical, gas or biological 
weapons intended for use in 
warfare," specifically prohibited by 
the Palau Constitution. Prof. Clark 
therefore states that "On a literal 
interpretation of Article 11, Section 
3 of the Constitution the Compact 
Itself required a 75% majority. The 
State Department's 'strong victory' 
of 62% was In fact a defeat." He 
adds that, " I do not see how the 
Palau legislature or executive 
could override the Constitution t:-y 
presenting the issue in a different 
way. Nor do I see how the Palau 
and U.S. executives could override 
the Constitution. An unconstitu-
tional treaty Is just that-unconsti-
tutional." 
In addressing the question of the 
ballot wording , Prof. Clark begins 
by quoting from the ballot: 
"BEFORE THE COMPACT CAN 
TAKE EFFECT SECTION 314 
UNDER QUESTION (B) BELOW 
MUST ALSO BE APPROVED BY 
AT LEAST SEVENTYFIVE 
PERCENT (75%) OF THE VOTES 
CAST. 
(B) Do you approve of the 
Agreement concerninq radioac-
tive, chemical and biological 
materials concluded pursuant to 
Section 314 of the Compact of Free 
Association?" 
Prof. Clark's examination of the 
drafting history of the ballot makes 
it quite clear that the United States 
not only concurred beforehand in 
the wording of the ballot, but in fact 
dictated the language to Palau 
Ambassador Salii in a telegram on 
November 11 , 1982. He concludes 
that, "The United States, having 
acquiesced In, or perhaps even 
Insisted upon, the way In which the 
Issue was presented to the voters, 
Is surely bound by the results. The 
voters were asked for a 75% 
majority; they did not give it; 
Section 314 and the Agreement 
were defeated. The Compact 
cannot take effect." 
Prof. Clark's treatment of the 
Radioactive Agreement is equally 
to the point, and is brief enough to 
be quoted in full : 
"Article I of the Radioactive 
Agreement provides: 
" In accordance with Article II , 
Section 3, and Article XIII, Section 
6, of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Palau, the Government 
of Palau shall seek approval of this 
Agreement by not less than three-
fourths of the votes cast in a 
referendum in which this specific 
question shall be presented in 
conjunction with the plebiscite on 
the Compact. 
"By the Preamble and Article 11 of 
the Agreement, Section 314 of 
Compact was to be 'incorporated 
by reference into, and beeome a 
part of' the Agreement. 
"The Government of Palau did 
just what it promised to do. It 
sought approval of the Agreement 
in a referendum 'in conjunction 
with' the referendum on the 
plebiscite. It failed to obtain the 
necessary votes. The agreement 
incorporating Section 314 was 
defeated. The Compact cannot 
'take effect. · " 
Whatever one's position on the 
merits-or lack thereof-of the 
Compact of Free Association, Prof. 
Clark's arguments show quite 
clearly that the Compact, in its 
present form, with its present 
subsidiary agreements, has been 
rejected by the Palauan voters, 
who knew quite clearly what they 
were doing . The important 
question at this point , therefore, is 
not whether or not the Compact 
has been approved, nor how to go 
about implementing it; the 
Compact is legally dead. The issue 
to be dealt with now is what options 
are still available. 
As Prof. Clark states in his memo 
to MSC, "The United States has 
obligations under the Trusteeship 
Agreement . One of those 
obligations is to promote the 
progressive development of the 
Trust Territory towards self-
continued on page 20 
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''Respect Our Culture'': Chief lbedul 
There are many reasons why the Compact, in its 
present form, is not acceptable to the people of Palau. 
Some are obvious. Some not so obvious. I need not 
dwell on Section 314. In accordance with our Constitu-
tion, the people have overwhelmingly delivered a 
message that we do not wish to have nuclear and other 
harmful substances in Palau. We are a peace loving 
people. We have tasted the horrors of war. In exercis-
ing our right to self-determination, we now choose not 
to be placed in a similar position again. We simply say 
to the United States, let us live in peace without 
becoming a military puppet. Give us our right to self-
determination and do not impose upon us the horrors 
and terror which may follow from the introduction of 
nuclear weapons into Palau . 
The other reasons why the Compact, in its present 
form, is not acceptable to the people of Palau may be 
somewhat less obvious. Let me remind you that Article 
73 of the Charter of United Nations mandates the 
administering authority recognize that the interests of 
the inhabitants of Palau are paramount and that in 
ensuring the political , economic, social and educa-
tional advancement of the people, the administering 
authority shall always give "due respect to the culture 
of the peoples concerned." These guiding principles 
have not been followed in the Compact in its present 
form. 
Culturally and traditionally, the traditional leaders of 
Palau, the Council of Chiefs, must be closely consulted 
on any issue as sensitive as the land use rights which 
are granted to the United States under the Compact. 
The land system in Palau emanates from the traditional 
clan system. Our clan system is still strong and viable 
after several thousand years of experience. This 
explains why, during the recent plebiscite, 5 of the 8 
st.ates in which the United States would have either 
exclusive or joint use of land, including the state of 
Koror where over 65% of all Palauans reside, voted 
against not only Section 314 but also the Compact as 
a whole. 
To successfully implement a compact in Palau 
which gives the United States use of our precious 
lands, close consultation and agreement with our 
traditional council of chiefs is absolutely essential. 
As a practical matter, regardless of the assurances of 
the Palauan administration, without such consultation 
and agreement, it will be impossible to implement and 
effectuate a compact involving jo int or exclusive use 
of land. The people and the traditional leaders will not 
stand idly by and permit their lands to be confiscated 
contrary to the constitutional safeguards which exist. 
Too much is at stake! Too much is inconsistent with 
the basic tenets of the United Nations Charter giving 
due respect to the culture of the peoples concerned. 
Until the United States recognizes and comes to grips 
with this basic point, there will not be a viable Compact 
of Free Association . 
The trad:tional leaders of Palau do not believe that 
the United States has honored its obligations under 
the trusteeship agreement to promote the economic 
advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants 
of Palau. To this end, for a compact to be viable, due 
recognition of this fact must be given and provisions in 
the area of capital improvement projects must accom-
modate this concern . Thus, there must be a renegotia-
tion of the Compact dealing with capital improvement 
projects designed to create an infrastructure wh ich 
will enable Palau to realize economic self-sufficiency. 
The people of Palau welcome and embrace the con-
cept of a relationship of free association with the 
United States. The United States is our friend and 
we recognize that. But, the United States must realize 
that a commitment to a compact will have a profound 
effect for many years to come. Accordingly, we must 
exercise the utmost care in approving a viable com-
pact. Contrary to the last plebiscite, the people must 
be fully and impartially informed and educated regard-
ing the choice they are being asked to make. It cannot 
and should not be thrust upon them. Instead, once a 
compact is negotiated which satisfies the elected 
government and the traditional leaders, then , a slow, 
deliberative process of fair and impartial education 
must be afforded the people. If this is done, not in a 
political arena, but rather in accordance with our 
customs and traditions designed to reach a consensus 
of the people, a true and meaningful relationship 
between our two countries will be the ultimate out-
come. As a traditional paramount leader of Palau, I ask 
the United States to open a dialogue which will be con-
sistent with our customs and traditions. 
(Excerpted from a statement by Palau High Chief 
lbedul to the U.N. Trusteeship Council , New York, 
May 18, 1983.) 
Page20----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continued from page 18 
government or independence ... If it 
is acting as a trustee, the United 
States must surely avoid heavy-
h anded efforts to have the 
Constitution (of Palau) conform to 
what the United States wants." 
This is a point that the U.S. would 
do well to consider, particularly in 
light of the fact that four attempts 
in four years to get the Palauan 
people to change their constitution 
have met with failure. 
The United States Government 
would be wise to heed Prof. Clark's 
closing paragraph, and use it as a 
guide to future actions on their 
part: 
"There is not much doubt that 
there is strong sentiment in 
Palau for some kind of free 
association but without the 
military implications currently 
contained in the Radioactive 
Agreement, Section 314 of the 
Compact and possibly the 
Agreement regarding the 
Military Use and Operating 
Rights of the United States. I had 
the distinct impression two or 
three years ago that the United 
States' bottom line was 'denial' 
plus transit and overflight rights 
for its nuclear powered and 
nuclear armed vessels . They 
negotiated for much more than 
this as part of the Compact 
package. Has not the time come 
to negotiate another Compact 
package which contains the 
United States ' irreducible 
minimum and to present that to 
the voters? If the voters will not 
buy that, then both sides have to 
face up to independence. 
There are smaller Pacific 
mini-states than Palau that are 
surviving in the international 
community. There is nothing in 
the United Nations Charter 
which binds the people of the 
Trust Territory to permanent 
servitude to security interests as 
defined in Washington." 
(Joel Miles, a resident of Palau for 
many years, is currently doing gra-
duate work at the East West Center 
in Honolulu.) 
Aerial photo showing Koror, the capital of Palau. In the right fore-
ground is Malakai Harbor, the main commercial port and site of a 
proposed military installation. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
For further information on the 
legal/political issues raised by the 
Palau plebiscite and the Compact 
of Free Association. contact: 
1. Prof. Roger Clark, Rutgers Uni-
versity Law School, Camden, 
N.J., 08102. (609) 757-6390 (w). 
2.Prof. Howard Anawalt , Uni-
versity of Santa Clara Law 
School, Santa Clara, CA. 95051 . 
(408) 984-4443 (w) . 
(Copies of Prof. Clark's 10-page 
memorandum are available from 
MSC. See coupon for details.) 
Declaration of 
Traditional Leaders 
"Since Section 314 ... is an 
integral part of the Compact of 
Free Association and ... did not 
receive 75% of the votes cast in the 
referendum and plebiscite, there 
can be no other conclusion but that 
the Compact of Free Association, 
in its present form, has been 
defeated by a vote of the people of 
Palau and is now dead ... 
"The message delivered by the 
people of Palau in the referendum 
is: 
A . The Compact of Free 
Association, in its present form, is 
not acceptable to the people of 
Palau; 
B. The nuclear provisions of 
Section 314 of the Compact of Free 
Association are not acceptable to 
the people of Palau; 
C . The sensitive issues 
regarding land use rights may only 
be resolved by close consultation 
with and agreement by the 
traditional leaders of Palau , 
consistent with the Constitutional 
requirements of the Republic of 
Palau; 
0 . The Government of the 
United States of America has failed 
to honor its obligations under the 
United Nations Trusteeship Agree-
ment to promote the economic 
advancement and self-sufficiency 
of the inhabitants of Palau. 
Accordingly, for any future 
Compact to be acceptable, it must 
take that fact into account and 
initially provide for a satisfaction of 
that obligation. 
(Excerpted from a Declaration 
by the Traditional Council of 
Chiefs made in Koror, Palau 
February 23, 1983.) 
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Summary 
Prof. Clark's memorandum, the statements by the 
traditional leaders in Palau and the Palau Senate 
Resolution #87 all underline the legal and political 
reasons that the Compact of Free Association, in its 
present form, has been defeated by Palauan voters, 
despite State Department statements to the contrary. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Palau is the 
supreme law of the land. The Compact, because it is 
incompatible with the Constitution, is therefore an 
unconstitutional treaty. 
Nevertheless, Palau President Haruo Remeliik 
announced in early May, 1983 that the Compact, 
without the controversial nuclear provision (Section 
314) , will be put into force by late 1983. The U.S. has, 
however, stated clearly that it will not accept the 
Compact without the nuclear provision, nor will it 
renegotiate the Compact. Thus the President's state-
ment suggests State Department support for this plan 
to implement the Compact, as does the State 
Department's creation of a "transition office" in Palau 
for implementation of the Compact. Implementation of 
the Compact and its large scale aid program will make 
it increasingly difficult for Palauans to defend the 
integrity of their Constitution. 
As the U.S. continued to press the Palauans to 
"reconcile" their Constitution with U.S. military plans 
embodied in the Compact of Free Association , the very 
issues of democracy, and the right of Palau ans to self-
determine their future free of nuclear weapons are at 
stake. 
WHAT CAN YOU DO? 
Your action is needed to support Palau's right to self-
determine its future political status. The following are 
different ways you can help: 
1. In the U.S.: Provide your Congresspeople with 
information on the Palau situation. Secondly, urge 
your Congresspeople to request a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) audit of the more than 
$315,000 of federal funds spent on political 
"education" in Palau . Thirdly, request that 
oversight hearings be held to investigate U.S. State 
Department actions in Palau and for a review of the 
process for terminating the Trusteeship, now at an 
impasse. 
2. Ask members of your church group, anti-nuclear 
or other organizations to write or call their 
Congresspeople. There are no votes in Micro-
nesia, so Congresspeople will only take action if 
their constituents raise the issue. 
3. Internationally: Provide your United Nations 
delegation with information on Palau and request 
that they protest the rush to implement the 
Compact of Free Association. 
4. Provide material to your local media and write 
letters to the editor. 
5. Write the Micronesia Support Committee for a 
slide presentation on Micronesia and other 
information to take to your community 
organization for further education on the issues. 
6. Receive regular Palau Action Alerts from the Pacific 
Concerns Resource Center, P.O. Box 27692, Hono-
lulu, Hawaii 96827. 
7. Contact the U.S. Nuclear Free Pacific Network, 
942 Market Street, Room 711, San Francisco, CA 
94102, (415) 434-2988 for U.S. Congress updates 
and additional information on Palau and Micro-
nesia. 
The following Congresspeople are on committees that 
have jurisdiction over Micronesia. Please contact 
them, in addition to your own Congresspeople: 
• Rep. Morris Udall (AZ) 
Chairman, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
• Rep. John Seiberling (OH) 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Lands 
and National Parks 
• Rep. Sidney Yates (IL) 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations 
• Rep. Donald Dellums (CA) 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Installations 
and Facilities 
• Rep. Jim Weaver (OR) 
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
• Rep. Les AuCoin (OR) 
Appropriations Committee 
• Sen. Spark Matsunaga (HI) 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee 
• Sen. Gary Hart (CO) 
Armed Services Committee 
Address: 
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510 
U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
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Serving the Greater Bay Area from Oakland since 1874 
Palauans should know 
The people of the Palau Is-
lands of the Western Pacific 
know well the wages of war, 
and they want no more of 
them. 
In the late 1930s, as Japan 
fortified the Micronesian Is-
lands just before the Pacific 
war, Palauans were told that 
their military installations 5<>0 
miles east of the Philippines 
would protect them. 
When war erupted, the Pa-
lauan bases were instead mag-
nets for American attacks. The 
luxuriant volcanic and lime-
stone islands became the focus 
of fierce fighting that show-
ered death and destruction on 
them. killing tens of thousands 
of Americans. Japanese and 
Palauans. 
By 1945, the population of 
the tiny islands was only one-
fif th what it had been a centu-
ry earlier. 
Citing an island proverb that 
"when soldiers come, war 
comes," the 15,000 people of 
Palau have adopted the 
world's first constitution ban-
ning n•Jclear weapons on their 
soil. 
The constitution was adopt-
ed in 1979 as a prelude to a 
~hange in the political status 
of-the islands. Palau has been 
ctdministered by the United 
States as a United Nations 
trust territory since 1947. 
Now. the United States, 
which wants to build a net-
work of military installations 
on one-third of the islands' 179 
square-mile territory, wants 
that constitution changed as 
the price for a 50-year, $1 bil-
lion aid package and a mea-
sure of independence for the 
islands. 
On Feb. 10, more than 60 
percent of Palau's voters 
backed part of the deal, called 
a Compact of Free Associa-
tion. But a companion mea-
sure that would have nullified 
the nuclear ban received only 
about 50 percent of the votes 
- far from the three- fourths 
majority needed for a constitu· 
tional amendment. 
The islands are crucial to 
U.S. plans for Micronesian 
bases as fall-back positions to 
facilities in the Philippines and 
Japan. 
Back in 1972, the Pentagon 
specified what it wanted: 32,-
000 acres of one island for jun-
gle warfare training and nu-
clear storage facilities; rights 
of way for landing craft and 
troops on assault training ma-
neuvers; the use of the port as 
a transit base for nuclear sub-
marines and warships and the 
right to train foreign troops -
possibly making Palau an 
Asian version of the Army~ 
training school in Panama 
where U.S. advisers train se-
curity forces for U.S.-backed 
Latin American governments. 
That was what the Palauans 
rejected on Feb. 10 ••• 
"We don't want any form of 
military to come. What 's 
wrong with our life today? We 
go fishing and to. our garden 
and get food and cook it. If you 
need some money you take 
vegetables to market. What's 
the matter with this?" 
To bring these two world 
views together could well be 
an impossible task. If so, there 
is little question that the Pa-
lauans' moral mandate should 
prevail. 
Sunday. February 20, 1983 
Information Available from MSC: 
Printed Material: 
1. From Trusteeship to ... ?-Mlcronesla And Its 
Future, a 68-page, fully illustrated booklet with a 
history and chronology of events of the political 
status talks in Micronesia, and featuring an analysis 
of the Compact of Free Association. In U.S. mail 
zones: $4.50 surface; $5.50 airmail. Overseas: $4.50 
surface; $6.50 airmail. In Micronesia: $3.50 airmail. 
2. Memorandum on the Palau Plebiscite, March 29, 
1983 by international law Professor Roger S. Clark. 
10 pages-$1 . 
3. "Self Determination and Free Association : Should 
the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands 
Trust?" by Roger S. Clark. Harvard International 
Law Journal, Winter, 1980. An 86-page review of the 
development of the Compact of Free Association 
and the Marianas Commonwealth. Discusses 
whether these political statuses meet up to the 
U.N.'s minimum requirements for terminating a 
Trusteeship. Over 400 footnotes. $7.50. 
4. Marshall Islands Chronology, 1944-1981, a 40-
page, illustrated booklet focusing on the nuclear 
weapons testing, health problems resulting from 
people's exposure to radioactive fallout and 
resettlements of people. In U.S. mail zones: $3 first 
class; Overseas: $4 airmail. 
5. MSC Bulletin Special l11ue, Summer 1982. 62 
pages, with illustrations. A collection of articles 
between 1975-1982, provid ing background on 
political status developments, economic 
development issues, military plans, CIA activity, 
nuclear waste dumping and nuclear tests, and 
health in Micronesia. $3. 
6. Ebeye, Marshall Islands: A Public Health Hazard, 
by Gregory Dever, M.D. 28 pages, focusing on 
health and social conditions on Ebeye Island, next 
to the Kwajalein Missile Range. $3. 
7. MSC Bulletln. Issued quarterly. One year 
subscription is $5 for individuals/ $1 O for groups. 
Internationally, add $2.50 for airmail. 
Please send me: 
8. The Pentagon Stalks Micronesia: Strategic Interests 
vs. Self Determination, by Giff Johnson. An 8-page 
reprint providing an overview of the U.S. administra-
tion of Micronesia, with a focus on past, present and 
future military activity. 50¢ 
9. Kwajalein : Home on the "Range", by Darlene Keju 
and Giff Johnson. An 8-page reprint on the develop-
ment on the Kwajalein Missile Range, Ebeye and 
Operation Homecoming, the 1982 sail-in protest. 50¢ 
Slide presentations: 
1. Micronesia: America's Strategic Islands. A 129-
slide, 25 minute presentation overview of 
Micronesia under American administration. Write 
for brochure with more details. Purchase price is 
$75 for individuals or non-profit groups; $100 for 
institutions. It is also available for rent. 
2. Marshall Islands: America's Radioactive "Trust" A 
118-slide, 25 minute show focusing on the nuclear 
testing, resettlement of people and health effects of 
radiation exposure. Costs are same as above. 
_ The following publications----------------------------
_ Information of MSC slide presentations. 
_ MSC's quarterly Bulletin. Enclosed is my subscription ($5 individual/ $10 organization) . 
_ Extra copies of this publication - $1 each (bulk rates on request) . 
_ I enclose a total of $ ------
NAME: 
Return to: Micronesia Support Committee, 1212 University Ave., Honolulu, HI 96826 

